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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah

I
\

WAYNE c. CLOSE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
HAROLD G. BLUMENTHAL and
VIRGINIA A. BLUMENTHAL,

CASE
NO. 9196

Defendants and AppeHants.

Respondent's Petition for Rehearing,
and Brief in Support Thereof
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing
Respondent, Wayne C. Close, petitions tJhe Oourrt fur
a rehearing in this case upon the ~ounds hereinafiteT set
forth.

In support of said Petition, respondent relies upon the
following points:
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POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT
THJE SELLER ON A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
LAND HAD TO RETURN THE PAYMENT MADE OR
BE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING AN ACITON FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
POINT ll
THIS COURT ERRED IN THAT IT DISREGARDED
THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF THIS JURISDICTION

IN REACHING THE RESULT THAT IT DID.
POINT ill
THIS COURT ERREID IN ASSUMING THAT THE

BUYER WAS INDUCED TO SIGN THlE CONTRACT
SUED UPON UPON THE REPRESENTATION THAT
THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED WOULD BE THE EXTENT
OF HIS LIABILITY.
WHIEREFORE, respondent prays that his petition for
rehearing be g:ranrted and that upon such rehearing, and

after oonsideration of fue re·oord, and the law, the decision
of the oowt be recalled, and the District Corurt's decision

affimled.
Dallas H. Young, Jr., for
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN

Attorneys for Respondent
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT EJRRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT
TH!E SELLER ON A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
LAND HAD TO RETURN THE PAY,MENT MADE OR
BE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION FOR
SPOCIFIC PERFDRMANCE.

POINT II
THIS COURT ERRED IN THAT IT DISREGARDED
THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF THIS JURISDlCTION
IN REACHING THE RESULT THAT IT DID.
POINT III
THIS COURT ERRED· IN ASSUMING THAT THE
BUYER WAS INDUCED TO SIGN THlE CONTRACT
SUED UPON UPON THE REPRESENTATION THAT
THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED WOULD BE THE EXTENT
OF HIS LIABILITY.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT EJRRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT
THJE SELLER ON A CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
LA-ND HAD TO RETURN THE PAYMENT MAiDE OR
BE PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING AN ACTION FOR
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
The court's decision is again:st the esta;blished law of
the Sta:te m Utah and against the "almost unanimous" rule
of the jurisdictions of this country. The Supreme C01urt
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of the United States has ruled rto rthe contmry. Stewart Vs.
Griffith, 217 U. S. 323, 54 L. ed. 782, 30 Sup. Ot. Rep. 528,
19 Ann. Oas. 639. So have almost all of the coll.ll"ts of this
country. Rogers Vs. Dorrance, 140 Md. 419, 117 Atl. 564,
32 ALR 573.

The following states have adopted a rule which is exactly opposite to the rule annorunced by this court in this
case: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connooticut, ~laware, Idaho, illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Dou.isiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, RJhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.
There are sorund reaso!lls why these jurisdictions have
adopted rthe rule. They are corvrect. This court is wrong
in its announced rule. Plaintiff cannot find one case outside this jurisdiction to support the oourt's ruling.
The cases which support the reasoning of the courts
of the above jurisdictions are set out in annotati01l1S found
in 32 ALR 584, and 98 ALR 887.
In nearly all those cases decided by the courts of the
above states, the contracts were less favorable ·to the seller
than in this oase. In almost every one of those contracts,
the contract expressly provided that in the event of breach,
the money paid would be forfeited. No option was given
the sellers. The contract provisions pro~ded expressly
that the payments would be forfeited as damages. Yet the
oourts unijjorml.y hold that such contract prOvisions do not
preclude an action for specific perfunnance.
One of the principal reasons for reaching this result
is that the ooorts conclude that _contracts should be per-
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formed not breached. Unless the contrary appears, the
courts unanimously assume that the deposit is made to insure performance, not to entitle the buyoc rto viotlate the
contJraot. 32 ALR 585 at 588.
"The question is whether the sum promded to be forfeited as 'liquidated damages' was intended as security
~or the performance of the contract, o~ whether the
clause is to be construed as an option by which, at the
election of the purchaser, he could pay the purchase
money and take the land, or refuse 1Jo take the land
and lose the money which had been paid. The fact that
the sum is stated to be 'liquidated damages' is immaterial, unless ,the contract is 1Jo be ccmstrued as an opUon, and the forleiture of the sum named sUJbstituted
thr the payment of the purchase money, at the purchaser's election." Don~hoe Vs. Franks (1912) 199
Fed. 262, Supra.
"When rtJhe penalty appears ifJo be intended merely as a
security ~or the perfbrmance of the agreement, the
principal object of the parties will be carried out."
Dooley Vs. Watsoo, (1854) 1 Gray (Mass.) 414.
"It was competent ~or the parti·es to make an ·alternative
agreement by which the purchasers are given the right
to complete the purchase or to pay a stipulated amount
of money by way of damages in place of perlormance,
and, where that is the agreement, specifiJc perfunnance
of the contract will not be decreed. The question in
every case of ifhis kind is whether the provision :for the
forfeiture of a prescribed amount is made 1io secure
performance or as a substitute fo[' performance. If
the stipulation shows that it was a mere penalty to secure compliance with the conditions orf the oonrtract, a
court will enfo['ce it, but, if it shO!Ws that it was alternative in character, giving ·the party the option to per-
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form or pay a stipulaJted amount in lieu thereof, specific perfmmance will ibe denied.'' Knisely vs. Robinson (1922) 111 Kan. 300, 206 Bac. 877.
This court gave the provision ih question an interpretation exac1Jly opposite to the one given by all o.f the courts

of other jurisdictions.
The insertion of the option oo the part of the seller
should strengthen not reduce the seller's rights. Yet vhis
court penalizes the seller because he has the expressed option to require performance or retain the money paid as
damages.
Few of the contract provisioos contained in the cases
cited in the 32 ALR 584 and 98 ALR 887 ann01tJations provided alternative 10ourses of action for the seller. Nearly
all of fue cases provided that the payments made would be
forfeited as liquidated damages. The courts hold almost
unanimously ,that even though the contracts say that rthe
amoUlllt paid will be retained as liquidated damages, still
the seller has an option. The option is to accept the amount
paid or erl]o~ce the contract. Some o.f the contract prmisions 'Cited in 32 ALR 584 are as follows:
". . . if the purchaser fails to perform, the earnest
money 'shall, at the option orf the vendor and his agents,
be furleited as liquidated damages,' and this contract
shall beoome null and void. Egle Vs. Morrison, (1904)
27 Ohio C. C. 497;
''. . . if either party fails to perlorm, he shall forfeit to
the other party $500 as 'liquidated damages.' Kettering
Vs. Eastlack (1906) 130 Iowa 498, 107 N. W. 177, 8
Ann. Oas. 357;
". . . if the vendee fails to comply with the contract,
the $100 paid by him shall-be 'forfeited by him and
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retained by said vendor as liquidated damages for its
breach.' Ochs Vs. Kramer (1908) 32 Ky. L. Rep. 762,
107 S. W. 2~60. (The court said that it did not think
the contract an alternative one·; that rthe clause in respect 1Jo the fur:feittrre of the $100 was evidently inserted by way of penalty, and with the object of securing full performance of the contract, and not wi1th
the view that the payment should oonstitute a performance of ·the contract ~and theTeby op&ate as a discharge thereof) ;
". . . in ICase of forfeiture by purchaser for failure to
, make stipulated payments, the vendor may retain improvements and one-half of ·the purohase money and
all interest from the tax:es and expenses of insurance
paid thereon, 'as liquidated damages' for the breach
of the CO!lltract and foc rent of the premises, there being an express provision thaJt the vendor might waive
the forfeiture. Steel Vs. Long (1897) 104 lowa 38,
73 N. W. 470 (arguendo);

'" . . . in oase of default by the purchaser, the initial
payment or deposit orf $1,000 shall be forleited as 'liqtrl.dated damag·es.' Rittenhouse Vs. Swiecicki (1922)
_ _..
N J: Eq.
, 118 Atl. 261;
". . . if the purchaser fiails to make the payment when

due, he shall forleit ·all righrts undeT the contraot, ~and
all payments theretofore made slhall be retained by the
vendor as 'liquidated damages.' First Trust & Sav.
Bank Vs. Pruitt (1922) 121 S. C. 484, 113 S. W. 469;
First Trust & Sav. Bank Vs. Spratt (1922)
S.. C.
- - - · 113 S. E. 473;
". . . five hundred dollars paid in cash to bind the bargain to be forfeited if vendee makes default. Waddill
Vs. Sa:bree (1892) 88 Va." 1012, 29 Am. St. Rep. 766,
14 S. E. 849;
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". . . in ease either party fails to pocform the stipula-

ticms of the contract, oc any part of the same, he shall
pay the other the sum of $1,000 as 'damages for IlO!Ilfulfilment of the contract.' O'Brien Vs. Paulsen (1922)
192 I01wa 1351, 186 N. W. 440 (arguendo)."
None of cthe ooll.lrts of the states listed above required
the retmn of the money paid as a oondition to enforce the
con:tract.
Such a requirement ~ not realistic. The amount paid
by rthe buyer ma.y or may not be in the possession Off tlle
seller. Sometimes sellers have obligations to meet. Sometimes disputes arise between sellers and their agents. See
31 ALR 2d 8 where oases involving litigation between sellers
and brokers respecting earnest money payments are reported. The time for perlormance varies. In this case the
time for perf<ormance was 32 days after the payment. Oft
times the time for perlormance extends over a period of
years.
POINT IT
THIS COURT ERRED IN THAT IT DISREGARDED
THE ESTABLISHED LAW OF THIS JURISDICTION
IN REACHING THE RESULT THAT IT DID.
This court has given a vecy similar contract provision
a oomtruction exactly opposite to the one given in this
case. In the case of Soter .Vls. Snyder, 277 P2d 966, the
appellant made substantially the same argument as the
appellant made here.
In rthat case, the seller had sold personal property on
a oonditiooal sales contract. Part of that case reads as
follows:
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"Appellants contend that such judgment was contrary
to the law and the agreement of the parties because
by providing that the seller may at his option declare
the entire sum due and owing upon the purchasers' defaulting in any of the payments when due or within
30 days thereafter, and upon such failure of the purchasers, the sellers could retake possession of said prope11ty and could re1Jain any payments as liquidated damages, respondent thereby expressly agreed that his only
remedy for breach of this contract should be reposse:.::sion. We cannot agree with this argument. UndeT
their agreement, the purchasers specifically agreed to
pay a certain sum for the property involved, the balance of which was to be paid in installments until the
total purchase price was paid. It was further agreed
that the 'title of the property herein conditionally sold
should remain in rthe seUer until all of the agreements
of the purchasers shall have been perlormed and until all payments aforesaid ito the selle'r have been fully
paid, and upon full payment by the purchasers afiore-said to the seller, title shall thereupon pass and be vested in purchasers.' It would be unreasonaJble to oonstrue such a contract as meaning that the parties
thereto intended that the seller could not, if he so desired, insist upon 'being paid the purchase price, merely because he had an option to repossess the property.
To so argue is to ignore the meaning of the word 'option.'" Soter Vs. Snyder, supra.
There are other similarities between the Soter case
and this case. According to the contract in this oase, possession of the property was to be deliver·ed on April 28,
1959, 33 days before the balance of the purchase price was
due. Likewise possession of the goods sold had been delivered in the Soter case. The presumption is that the contract was performed. 13 Covpus Juris 762, Contracts Sec-
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tion 9'53; 20 American Jurisprudence 222, Evidence Section

So, presumwbly, the buy& was in possession. The
oonrtJract p~rovided that interest would be charged from Ap227.

ril 28, 1959.

Under the contract as executed, the risk af

destruction of the property fell upon tile buyeT after April
28, 1959. The remaining balance due was the balance of
the purchase price and yet in spite of all fuese things-delivery of possession, the agreement on the part of the buyer

to pay interest on fue amount due under the agreement, the
assumption of risk for damage to the property---still this
oourrt under the present opinion precludes the seller from

maintaining an action for specific performance. Either this
case is wrong, or the Soter ease is wrong.

Obviously, the

OOUflt is in error in this case.

POINT III
THIS COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT THE
BUYER WAS INDUCED TO SIGN THE CONTRACT
SUED UPON UPON THE REPRESENTATION THAT
THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED WOULD BE THE EXTENT
OF HIS LIABILITY.
No such facts were ever claimed by the defendants.
The contract itself pr01virled for interest oo the balance of
the purchase price. The contract provided that the risk
of destruction of the property was upon the defendants after
April 28, 1959 (R. 36). In making the assumptioo that
it did, the court not ooly assumed facts not in the record,
it ignored the facts whi:ch are in the record to the contrary.
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CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully 'submits that :the court erred
m reaching the conclusion that it did reach. Under the
oourt's ruliJng, Utah will represent a minority view of this
rule of law and it will be the single state representing that
minority view. This case changes the law of the State of
Utah from a sound 1Jo an unsound e<mdition. This case
should be re-argued and the judgment of the District COurt
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Dallas H. Young, Jr., for
YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
227 North Unive~si:ty Avenue
Provo, Utah
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